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Tory Ideology and Social Policy under Theresa May: Current and Future Directions 
Ben Williams  
 
Since becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May has sought to gradually establish a distinctive 
policy agenda, specifically in social terms. Although much of her initial attention 
understandably focused on Brexit, as she settled into Downing Street she endeavoured to 
cultivate a political narrative bearing her own imprint. She has consequently sought to 
distinguish her government from what she has perceived to be the less appealing aspects of 
David Cameron’s regime (both implicitly and explicitly). This has entailed attempting to 
distance herself from the Cameron administration’s often socially exclusive and elitist 
‘Notting Hill’ image, its advocacy of relentless and inflexible austerity, and the harsh and 
divisive social consequences that have often prevailed. Of course, in the wake of the Tories’ 
losses and Labour’s gains in the 2017 General Election, May no longer has a majority in 
parliament. She is reliant on the socially conservative DUP for a majority, and their 
cooperation can by no means be taken for granted. In the Queen’s Speech on 21 June, many 
policies set out in the Conservative manifesto were absent, including plans to change the 
funding of social care for the elderly, means-testing the winter fuel allowance for the elderly, 
and downgrading the triple lock on pensions.  
 
Yet May remains Prime Minister for now, and it is therefore worth assessing to what 
extent her premiership represents a retreat from the political regime that immediately 
preceded it. Of course, May had a prominent role within both Cameron administrations, 
before and after 2015. This makes it hard in some ways for her to offer a genuinely new 
direction in Conservative social policy. Though her days in 10 Downing Street may well now 
be numbered, this essay asks whether May is likely to have any more success than Cameron 
in formulating a coherent, credible and effective Conservative social policy agenda that will 
stand the test of time, while also contributing to a revived party image, identity and broader 
electoral appeal in the longer term.  
 




From the late 1970s onwards, the Conservative Party embraced a forceful Thatcherite image 
and agenda, with the New Right’s ‘vigorous virtues’1 and neoliberal ideology supplanting 
previous ‘consensual’ One Nation traditions. Thatcher’s combative, ideological style 
represented a breach from the party’s pragmatic and empirical past, and created both 
opportunities and problems for British Conservatism. Firmly rejecting the ‘post-war 
consensus’, the Conservatives under Thatcher constructed an alternative political narrative, 
focused on individual liberty, free markets and the small state. In the decade that followed, 
Thatcher’s approach, along with various pieces of good fortune, saw her win three successive 
general election victories. Yet, her period in power accelerated the disruption of traditional 
class-based loyalties and much of the UK’s social equilibrium, creating significant periods of 
social division, dislocation and unrest, especially at the start and end of the 1980s. This, in 
turn, made the Conservative Party increasingly vulnerable to a political backlash from a 
volatile electorate. Thatcher’s key social and economic policies involved: prioritising inflation 
over unemployment, withdrawal of state subsidies for failing industries, tighter control of the 
money supply (monetarism), and a flagship privatisation programme that created ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ and contributed to a notable widening of inequality, notably through council 
house sales. Further to this, her decade or so of political dominance also saw the introduction 
of internal markets in the NHS, the national curriculum in schools, and the slow but steady 
erosion of social welfare benefits.2 In the context of such radical social policy change alongside 
accelerating deindustrialisation, inequality soared.     
 
 In the 1990s, the difficult social implications of some Thatcherite policies came home 
to roost.  The social dislocations of the 1980s came to seem by to many to be the 
Conservatives’ Achilles heel. John Major (like the ‘modernising’ David Cameron a decade and 
half later) aimed to make the party’s image and agenda seem less harsh, and spoke 
optimistically about a ‘classless society’, and a ‘nation at ease with itself’. There was also a 
 
1 See S.R.Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism, London, 1992 
2 See Institute for Fiscal Studies, http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/incomes_in_uk. In 
1979, 13.4% of the population lived below 60% of median incomes before housing costs. By 1990, it 





revival of the idea of ‘Civic Conservatism’, particularly from David Willetts.3 Some of these 
themes were taken up by Cameron from 2005 onwards, in the context of a global re-invention 
of ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ stemming primarily from the USA, during George W. Bush’s 
presidency (2001-9). In the 1990s, however, Major struggled to achieve a coherent and 
credible social policy agenda, facing, as he did, economic crises, political scandals and a 
resurgent Labour Party under Tony Blair.  
 
Cameron’s modernization of social policy  
 
In seeking to formulate and market to voters an improved Conservative political ‘offer’, since 
the late 1990s a key area of social policy for Conservative ‘modernisers’ has been the 
potentially dynamic sphere of ‘non-state’ activity, in between government and the individual 
(often referred to as ‘civil society’). Civil society has been increasingly viewed as an important 
focus for social policy innovation, with the output of such actions described by David Cameron 
and his political sympathisers as ‘social capital’.  Cameron consolidated this evolving political 
discourse by instigating his much-criticized ‘Big Society’ agenda, which suggested that a 
controlling, centralised state did not have all of the answers to the country’s long-term social 
problems. Launching the idea in 2009, Cameron said that: 
 
The size, scope and role of government in Britain has reached a point where it is now 
inhibiting, not advancing the progressive aims of reducing poverty, fighting inequality, 
and increasing general well-being. Indeed there is a worrying paradox that because of 
its effect on personal and social responsibility, the recent growth of the state has 
promoted not social solidarity, but selfishness and individualism. But … just because 
big government has helped atomise our society, it doesn’t follow that smaller 
government would automatically bring us together again.4  
 
 
3 D.Willetts, Civic Conservatism, London, 1994. 





This apparent rejection of both Labour’s supposed inclination towards ‘big government’ and 
the Thatcherite focus on a ‘small state’ and the free market, formed the basis of a broader 
attempt to ‘modernise’ the Conservative Party’s appeal. This re-branding was linked to 
evidence from focus groups and opinion polling that indicated that the party had become out 
of touch with the social aspirations and values of early twenty-first century British society. 
The Big Society agenda was a form of triangulation: it presented the Conservatives as 
libertarian and anti-statist, while also seeking to suggest that they cared about society, 
community, and social issues. Distancing himself rhetorically from Thatcher’s claim that there 
is ‘no such thing as society’, Cameron instead argued that ‘there is such thing as society, it is 
just not the same as the state’.5  
 
Alongside the ‘Big Society’ rhetoric, the Conservatives under Cameron adopted a more 
‘permissive’ tone, encouraging a more tolerant mood regarding issues such as gay rights, 
multiculturalism, and environmentalism, more liberal views towards marriage and divorce, 
and enhanced equality laws; reflecting a more diverse British society and looking favourably 
on an ‘enabling’ role for the state in delivering practical policy outcomes in such areas. While 
this social liberalism has been applauded by many, most political observers have gradually 
come to view the ‘Big Society’ more cynically, as a vacuous policy initiative. Indeed, some of 
Cameron’s own internal party critics cited this particular social agenda as a confusing factor 
that blurred the party’s appeal during the inconclusive 2010 general election campaign; and 
it was hardly mentioned at all in 2015, before vanishing without trace in 2017. Opponents 
from other parties have alleged that former PR man Cameron sought to use ‘Big Society’ 
rhetoric to mask significant public spending cuts imposed by his post-2010 administration, 
while much academic and media debate has subsequently centred on whether The Big Society 
was a genuinely significant development in Conservative social policy, or merely a marketing 
ploy to disguise the realities of austerity.6 
 
As a senior Cabinet Minister under Cameron in the coalition government after 2010, 
Theresa May never displayed much obvious public enthusiasm for the concept of the ‘Big 
 
5 Extract from Cameron's victory speech after the Tory leadership election result, BBC News, 
6.12.05, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4504722.stm. 
6 See J.Edwards, ed, Retrieving the Big Society, London, 2012.  
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Society’, although earlier in her political career she made a high-profile intervention at Tory 
party conference in 2002, when she acknowledged that the Conservatives were out of touch 
with social attitudes and seen as ‘the nasty party’. However, she supported the post-2010 
emphasis on austerity in the wake of the 2007-8 economic crash, and a policy agenda that 
shrank the state while hoping a decentralised and voluntarist civil society would take over 
some of its core functions. Negative social implications have certainly arisen from the long 
years of austerity: the growth of foodbanks and homelessness, as well as reduced welfare 
benefits for some vulnerable groups. Given the tight financial constraints imposed by the 
narrative of austerity, there was limited room for manoeuvre in terms of social policy 
radicalism under Cameron between 2010-16, and the roll-out of the major social security 
policy innovation of these years – IDS’s ‘Universal Credit’ – was dogged by administrative 
problems and stymied by lack of funding.7 Universal credit, and the regime of benefit 
sanctions that has accompanied it, have been widely criticised in the left-wing press as harsh 
and punitive towards the poor. Cuts to tax credits announced by Osborne as Chancellor but 
introduced in 2017 have likewise been controversial.  
 
Theresa May’s ‘meritocratic’ social policy  
 
In early speeches as Prime Minister, May emphasised her ‘social’ credentials using carefully 
chosen language such as ‘fairness’, ‘making government work for all people’, ‘opportunity’, 
and ‘social mobility’; she even claimed at the 2016 Conservative Party Conference that the 
Conservatives were now the ‘workers’ party’.8 The latter claim is a direct and provocative 
assault on Labour’s traditional identity, and in making it, May was aiming to outflank the 
radical appeal of Jeremy Corbyn’s ‘new politics’. In adopting such an approach, May has 
sought to formulate a political ‘offer’ not overly-reliant on the free market, which 
acknowledges the existence of socio-economic inequality, yet which also asserts that most 
people are unified by a sense of personal aspiration, that can be fulfilled by well-managed 
‘popular capitalism’. Where Cameron offered a paternalistic aura and metropolitan image, 
 
7 G.Morris, ‘Universal Credit, Ideology and the Politics of Poverty’, Renewal, 24.3, 2016.  






May appears to advocate more ‘bottom-up’ and ‘suburban’ social mobility. She has 
repeatedly emphasised the values of her aspirational middle-class grammar school 
background, as opposed to Cameron’s upper-class private education and inherited wealth. 
 
This has been most evident in May’s attempts to revive the thorny debate over 
grammar schools, which in recent times has been a divisive issue for the Conservatives. Critics 
both within and outside her party claim grammar schools benefit only limited social groups, 
widen educational inequality and are a misguided return to a high-profile failure of the past. 
Indeed, while in opposition in 2007, David Cameron famously voiced his vehement opposition 
to a revival of grammar schools, arguing it was not an issue for ‘an aspiring party of 
government’ but more suitable for a ‘right-wing debating society’. He asserted that those 
advocating grammar schools were ‘splashing around in the shallow end of the educational 
debate’ and ‘clinging on to outdated mantras that bear no relation to the reality of life’.9  May, 
however, (as a grammar school product) has identified such schools as a tool for improving 
social mobility, arguing that the current educational status-quo favours the wealthier families 
who can afford private schools, or the striving middle classes who can pay to live closer to the 
best state schools. She has argued that the re-invention of this controversial policy will make 
Britain into a ‘great meritocracy’,10 and hopes to appeal to aspirational skilled working class 
and lower-middle class families (as well as socially authoritarian and traditionalist UKIP-
inclined voters). She has sought to depict Labour’s opposition to the policy as anti-
aspirational, yet whether academic selection produces more winners than losers is doubtful, 
with most contemporary research (indeed, most research in the last four decades) concluding 
that it does not actually produce more social mobility.11 Opponents of May’s education 
policies have also emphasised that her government has outlined proposals to cut the existing 
schools budget by 6.5%,12 creating a clear prospect of winners and losers in the process. With 
 
9 ‘Cameron steps up grammars attack’, BBC, 22.5.07, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6679005.stm. 
10 May, ‘Britain, the great meritocracy: Prime Minister's speech on grammar schools’, 9.9.16, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-the-great-meritocracy-prime-ministers-speech. 
11 See findings of Educational Policy Institute, 23.9.16, 
http://schoolsweek.co.uk/epi-grammar-schools-report-the-7-key-findings/; J.H.Goldthorpe, 
C.Llewellyn, and C.Payne, Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain, Oxford, 1980. 




grammar school expansion dropped from the June 2017 Queen’s speech, it remains to be 
seen whether this policy will reappear, and how popular it really is. 
 
The Shared Society 
 
In early 2017 May’s social agenda began to take a more concrete shape, and there were some 
clear connections with Cameron’s social policy legacy. In the first month of 2017, May publicly 
launched her own social policy, curiously entitled the ‘Shared Society’.13 This seemed to both 
transcend yet also absorb elements of Cameron’s social agenda. May embraced a 
communitarian approach and, like Cameron, expressed enthusiasm for civil society: she 
argued the ‘shared society’ meant: 
 
A society that doesn’t just value our individual rights but focuses rather more on the 
responsibilities we have to one another; a society that respects the bonds of family, 
community, citizenship and strong institutions that we share as a union of people and 
nations; a society with a commitment to fairness at its heart. 
 
This strongly communitarian vision echoes New Labour’s emphasis on community and mutual 
responsibilities. But May also promised to move beyond the specific ‘social justice’ agenda 
that was established in the Blair/Brown years, and to some extent further developed under 
Cameron, stating that 
 
We will move beyond the narrow focus on social justice – where we help the very 
poorest – and social mobility – where we help the brightest among the poor. Instead, 
we will engage in a more wide-ranging process of social reform so that those who feel 
that the system is stacked against them – those just above the threshold that typically 
attracts the government’s focus today yet who are by no means rich or well off – are 









Neoliberal economists (so influential in the Thatcher era) refused to even countenance or 
acknowledge the significance of ‘social justice’ as a concept.14 Yet May has consistently 
recognised the importance of social justice (as did Cameron), while also promising to go 
beyond it. She has attempted to construct a wide constituency for the Conservative Party by 
rejecting the idea that ‘social justice’ is enough. Instead, she has argued that her government 
would help not only the poor and explicitly vulnerable, but also the ‘just about managing’. 
She has also spoken of the ‘burning injustices’ facing various specific social groups such as 
women, racial minorities, and the mentally ill which stretch back over generations, often 
which lack visibility, and which her government would seek to address. As evidence for this, 
in October 2017 she used the publication of a government audit on racial equality to 
emphasise her commitment to tackling the widespread problems found in the report.15 
 
This would suggest a degree of interventionist paternalism in May’s political approach 
that can be linked back to the party’s ‘One Nation’ traditions, s opposed to its Thatcherite 
heritage. It seems likely, however, that unless the Conservatives move much further away 
from ‘austerity’ than they have yet indicated, they will fail to find the funds to make good on 
May’s promises to use the state to improve people’s lives. Within this context, responses to 
the ‘Shared Society’ have so far been mixed, with one commentator describing it in positive 
terms as being the ‘Big Society plus the state – a welcome and much needed addition’,16 while 
another has, more negatively, called it a ‘gloomier version of the Big Society’.17  Mrs May 
arguably wants to have it all. Her social policy approach attempts to triangulate between 
‘Cameroon’ modernization, Thatcherite free markets and the Corbynite emphasis on social 
justice, and embraces broadly sympathetic language. Yet whether her specific version of 
social renewal can be delivered is questionable, and its ambition has been eroded by the 2017 
 
14 F.A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, London, 1978. 
15 ‘Audit lays bare racial disparities in UK schools, courts and workplaces’, Guardian, 10.10.17, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/09/audit-lays-bare-racial-disparities-in-uk-
schools-courts-and-workplaces. 
16 P.Blond, Twitter, 9.1.17. 




general election result and the subsequent resignations of her influential policy advisors, 
Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy.  
 
Since becoming Prime Minister, May has also promised government support for 
specific (and often neglected) social issues such as mental health and domestic violence,18 
indicating a commitment to improving the lives of vulnerable people and a willingness to 
further leverage the co-ordinating power of the state. This potentially marks a retreat from 
Cameron’s Big Society’ and its emphasis on networks of charitable, bottom-up endeavours. 
Yet critics of the post-2010 administrations have argued that actions speak louder than words, 
and that the austerity agenda and reduced public funding for such services over the past 
seven years is not consistent with this positive rhetoric. Indeed, official government figures 
from 2016 suggest that mental health spending has been reduced by 8 per cent in real terms 
since 2010,19 with an estimated 20 per cent increased in demands for its services within the 
same period. In 2016/17, local authorities faced cuts of 28% funding cuts for domestic 
violence programmes, while the charity Refuge, a key provider of domestic violence services, 
has seen reduced funding affecting 80% of its service contracts since 2011.20 These statistics 
represent a fundamental critique of May’s social policy agenda and how realistic some of its 
goals are (given her continuous role in government since 2010). 
 
The stagnation of wages for many over the past decade (predicted to worsen after 
Brexit), alongside high income inequality and a recurring social housing crisis, increases the 
challenge for any government looking to improve the lives of the vulnerable, poor and ‘just 
about managing’. Conservative modernisers over recent years have argued that the state 
does not have a monopoly in delivering socially just outcomes, with charities, grassroots 
organisations and non-governmental agencies important too. Yet some of Cameron’s critics, 
 
18 ‘Prime Minister unveils plans to transform mental health support’, 9.1.17, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-unveils-plans-to-transform-mental-health-
support. 
19 A.McNicoll, ‘Mental health trust funding down 8% from 2010 despite coalition’s drive for parity of 
esteem’, Community Care, 20.3.17, 
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/03/20/mental-health-trust-funding-8-since-2010-despite-
coalitions-drive-parity-esteem/. 





such as Philip Blond,21 have argued that austerity strangled the ‘Big Society’ at birth, and it 
could be argued that for the ‘Shared Society’ to work effectively it will need to learn lessons 
from past failures and provide a financial boost and significant state co-ordination, at the very 
least in its early stages of development and evolution. Prior to the 2017 general election, the 
Conservatives’ Budget indicated that austerity was likely to remain broadly in place, with 
Chancellor Philip Hammond suggesting that the creation of a ‘resilient’ economy for post-
Brexit Britain was a bigger priority than enhanced levels of social policy spending.22 However, 
there have been suggestions from some senior Conservatives that austerity may be 
significantly relaxed in the wake of the 2017 electoral outcome, with an acknowledgment that 
the public are tired of the severities and sacrifices associated with it. Labour’s argument that 
an end to austerity and raised funding for public services is a vital prerequisite for adequate 
service provision is gaining ground – with “anti-austerity” a key and seemingly popular rallying 
cry at the 2017 General Election. In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower disaster in June 2017, 
the case for adequate public funding – and strong health and safety and fire regulations – has 
been shown to be absolutely vital.  It ultimately remains to be seen whether May and her 
Chancellor are prepared to accept that – and to significantly relax the brakes on austerity in 
the months ahead in order to provide improved funding for key public and social services. If 
they do not, they will almost certainly fail to deliver on their relatively bold, socially-themed 
promises. 
 
A New Social Conservatism? 
 
Despite the Thatcherite ideological interruption, the Conservative Party is historically 
pragmatic and flexible, and it has an instinct for populism and ultimately power. It also has a 
long history of social policy innovation and reform dating back to Benjamin Disraeli in the late 
nineteenth century. In a historical context therefore, it has shown an ability to pragmatically 
embrace the significant social reforms of Liberal and Labour governments whom it has 
succeeded in office. Contemporary British politicians face an increasingly unpredictable and 
 
21 P.Blond, ‘David Cameron has lost his chance to redefine the Tories’, Guardian, 3.10.12,  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/03/cameron-one-nation-u-turn-tory-
tragedy. 




demanding electorate that is increasingly de-aligned from traditional class-based loyalties, 
and in the immediate future British Conservatism needs to react and respond to the surprise 
outcome of the 2017 General Election. Much of the electorate was less than enthused about 
the Tory policy offer in 2017, and particularly about what the Tories had to say about society, 
community and equality.  May has so far both embraced and aimed to transcend the 
modernising Cameron approach to social policy matters: she has voiced concern for the most 
vulnerable in society, while also emphasising a renewed focus on those ‘just about managing’. 
However, her attempt to put grammar schools back at the heart of British political debate 
represented a deviation from the post-2005 modernizing project, and showed a side of May 
that is nostalgic for tradition and authority. Her attempts to triangulate – to offer something 
for everyone in her social policy agenda – seem increasingly vacuous, and in 2017 her socially-
oriented language appeared to harden amidst the strains of election campaigning. It does 
seem increasingly unlikely that May, hampered by restrictive parliamentary arithmetic and 
her fractious MPs, constrained by the narrative of the necessity of austerity, and distracted 
by Brexit, will be able to deliver a coherent social policy that can appeal to a restless electorate 
hit by ten years of stagnating real wages and living standards. This scenario therefore provides 
fertile ground for Labour to offer a critique of such Conservative initiatives, creating the 
conditions for an alternative approach that would seek to appeal to the unsettled public 
mood.  
 
Dr. Ben Williams, University of Salford 
 
